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Q. Can you briefly explain ICRAF’s mission, and why
ICRAF focuses specifically on agroforestry systems?
ICRAF looks at the ecological relationships within
agroforestry systems.  The important point is that most
debates still centre around a dichotomy: there is nature and
agriculture, nature provides environmental services and
agriculture does not.  We look at the agroforestry system as
in between those two poles and find that, although not as
much as nature forest, there is still substantial provision of
environmental services. Of course agroforestry is also less
productive than very intensive agriculture, which means
that if all economic incentives purely correspond with
productivity, then we will lose these intermediate intensity
systems. For many years policymakers have made statistics
about forest and agriculture as separate divisions. We see
that actually it can be both; agroforestry systems in well-
managed landscapes can be productive as well as protect
the environment. You have to look at a landscape as a
whole, the forest, the trees outside of the forest and the
agroforestry, and try to make sure that policies will be
realistic, will be based on services that are actually
provided. Then you can start designing adequate incentives.  
Q. Can you give us an example of this approach in
practice?
We worked on this landscape agroforestry concept at lower
elevations in Sumberjaya, Indonesia with shade-grown
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coffee. If you do it well, there is nothing wrong with the
water flowing from a catchment that is dominated by
coffee agroforest. Yet, these people were seen and treated
as illegal squatters. So, we worked on agreements to ensure
that they could stay there for as long as their coffee
agroforestry would prosper, with tenure conditional to
actually maintaining the landscape in good shape. In
practice this gives use rights to farmer groups, through co-
management with the forest authority. Within those
agreements, these are ways to secure environmental
services, to define conditionality in a way that makes sure
people understand that their rights are linked to
maintaining environmental services. They can’t do anything
they like with that land, but they can produce as long as
they don’t destroy or degrade the forests.  We have to
break through these perceptions about using forests for
agriculture: forests can still be functional and productive,
there’s nothing wrong with it. This paradigm shift helps
people out of poverty much more than the financial
payment alone. 
Q. Why does ICRAF prefer to use the term "rewarding
environmental services” (RES) rather than “payments
for environmental services” (PES)?
The environmental services themselves are not just natural
capital, they are the combination of natural capital, social
capital, and the human capital that maintain the service.
So, you don’t just pay for the current service; it is about
co-investment, it is about shared responsibility, it is about
shared risk.  For example, if you look at water, people can
merely be paid per cubic metre of clean water that comes
out of their watershed.  If it’s a dry year then there’s not
much water that they can sell, and these people won’t have
any income – this was our experience in Sumatra, where a
hydropower plant didn’t function during the dry season. The
upland communities didn’t do anything wrong, they put in
their effort to protect the ground cover in that slope, they
cannot control the climate.  The poor have little
opportunity to absorb risk.  So, I think that it’s about
sharing responsibility. It gives a different flavour to the
“PES” concept.
Q. How does ICRAF define PES?
We have four criteria: realistic, conditional, voluntary and
pro-poor.  So firstly, we assess whether there is a real
relationship between land use and the service. Many things
that are PES or PES-like may not actually pass the test on
that one. Payments are made because people believe that
an activity might work, but they don’t check this, don’t
make the most of scientific and local knowledge.  The
second part is conditionality.  The conditionality of a market
contract is, if you don’t deliver, you won’t get paid, and
vice versa.  The contract must identify obligations on both
sides and both parties needs to agree on how performance
is to be evaluated, and, as we discussed before, under what
conditions non-delivery would be acceptable.  This also
links with the voluntary aspects, which is really how PES
and PES-like mechanisms are contrasted with command and
control.  It is a contract that people can say yes or no to,
and negotiate its terms. That’s a very positive element and
potentially a big step forward from what we have seen
before. And of course, a pro-poor perspective is necessary
when considering the voluntariness of prospective PES: be
clear on the representation, be clear on the acuity within
these groups.  PES, if it favours land owners, can be anti-
poor, can exclude people from the land, reduce jobs,
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income opportunities, access to resources for poor people.
We saw this happen in Uganda around Mount Elgon where a
company gained access to land in order to plant trees and
sequest carbon, and excluded former land users.  These
people had traditional access rights, but under government
rules they did not.  A lot of current concerns about REDD
are that government agencies will be policing the forest and
keeping the people out by force in order to meet the
targets of emissions reductions.  If there are no other
safeguards, then REDD could actually enhance poverty.
Q. Is it possible to ensure “voluntary” conditions when
PES is essentially a communal, and often government-
legislated, arrangement?
If it is a government scheme, the rules cannot be
negotiated at a detailed level but people can opt out if
they don’t want to be a part of it.  However, there’s always
a big challenge in clarifying the minimum level of voluntary
and the scale at which it can be applied.  First of all, the
contract is generally with the farmers’ group or the
community.  So, it is not voluntary at the individual level
but it is voluntary at the communal level, which brings out
the question of who has the biggest voice in the group: is
it actually representing the interest of both men and
women, is it representing only the wealthy people, is it
representing the poor people?  Who is deciding to agree to
such a contract, on behalf of whom?  There has to be public
awareness, knowledge, joint understanding. We use the
reference of “free and prior informed consent”.  It’s not
enough if the head of a village puts a signature on a piece
of paper if the village people cannot understand what this
is about.  So, consent and agreement is only valid when it
is free.  If I force you to put a signature on that paper then
it is not valid, you are not free to say yes or no. It is also
only valid if we can be sure that both parties actually
understand it.  
Q. Is addressing poverty a realistic objective for PES in
and of itself, given that a service and measurable
outcomes have to be delivered?
In early papers it is argued that we should not confuse PES
with poverty, that we have to keep our objectives clear.  If
it is about PES then it’s about enhancing environmental
services, if it’s about poverty then it should be labelled as
such. We also come across the efficiency versus fairness
debate.  Efficiency means enhancing the environmental
services and enhancing the environmental services per unit
of money that’s being invested.  It is easy to see that pure
efficiency cannot work.  If you only talk to the people who
are polluting the river and you don’t give positive incentives
to people who have already been keeping the water clean,
then everyone will say, “OK, I only get attention if I start
polluting…”  A pure fairness approach cannot work either.  If
you give all the money to all the people who have been
benefitting the environment, then the environmental
service will not be enhanced because we’re not dealing
with the others.  So, 100% efficiency cannot work, 100%
fairness cannot work.  We therefore have to define a way to
deal with both and make some compromises between the
two.
Q. How close are we to fulfilling these four criteria in
existing PES programmes?
The well known cases of Costa Rica and Mexico that are
called PES are not really PES.  What it is, is a government
programme or drinking water company offering a subsidy to
forest owners who maintain their land as forest, but it is
not clear what type of forest, it is not clear how much
water it generates, it is not differentiated.  It is a similar
story with EU agri-environmental subsidies. What we see in
reality is that there is hardly any scheme that is 100%
realistic; hardly anything can apply full conditionality and
almost nothing is exactly voluntary, but all three are
directions in which you can make progress.  So, rather than
defining the end point as PES, we see it more as an
evolution of government systems.  The four criteria are
useful principles to aspire to.  And we see that rather than
saying “this is PES” and “this is not PES”, which is the focus
of many of the current debates, it is more useful to explore
what is being applied and how far we are meeting our
criteria.   
Q. Can you talk about the necessary institutional
capacity that needs to be in place for developing and
implementing PES?
One thing we are debating a lot at the moment is
transparency. Transparency means that at the lowest
possible level PES still has to be about delivery of the
service, for example carbon, about money and payments.
The same language, the same means of measurement have
to be applied across all scales.  But when we go to the
village, maybe we don’t need to bother people with carbon
measurement, maybe it’s good enough at that level to talk
about trees and things that they know and understand.  And
we can do the measurement, and translate the number of
trees back into carbon stock.  Maybe it is OK to use that
money for community services, health, education, roads
and whatever the local government would see as relevant
for livelihoods and social development.  At the same time,
we have to be able to account for every dollar and cent
that comes into the country, and of course institutions
need to deal with realistic, conditional, voluntary
conditions for core staffs. The question is whether we need
to deal with these principles in the same way at every
level.  One view is that at different scales, different
institutions can do their own things, in their own time
zone, their own currency, their own language, whatever is
appropriate there, as long as they can translate and as long
as there is an interpreter. The need for transparency seems
to reduce this freedom and this is a valid point, but it may
also be restricting the overall efficiency, as well as
fairness.
Q. Do you think this is realistic? Would a buyer ever
accept this sort of flexibility?
Well of course we have to agree on what is the expected
service, what is the baseline, what are positive outcomes
and so forth.  As an example, we might begin by measuring
the sediment load in the river altogether using simple
methods; we walk in the valley with the people and ask
where the sediment is coming from, and what can be done
about it.  And we offer the money.  We are not going to
look at tree cover if this is about sedimentation, but we
are going to measure sediment load in the stream.  In this
way you create clarity as to what a society actually wants
and expects: we want clean water from these landscapes
and we want this and those services. However, the local
people can decide how best to generate these outcomes.
For this to work you have to seek to bring your criteria as
close to the service as you can.  Actually at the
international scale Guyana is the country that is most
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actively pursuing this approach.  They have made a
national development plan that says, “We have the right
and opportunities to cut our older trees, we have had low
emissions so far but we could increase emissions
tremendously to develop our economy and improve the
wealth of our people.  But if we get enough incentives from
the international community, we will agree on a
development pathway that focuses on agriculture and
urban services and we’ll pull people away from the forests.
That way we’ll keep our emissions low, and we call that
REDD. We want investment from the global community for
REDD purposes but our institutions will do the
management, you can judge us on the basis of outcomes.”
That is attractive, I must say, especially when a lot of the
current REDD discussions are about micro-managing. 
Q. Where do the intermediaries (like ICRAF) fit into the
PES equation?
There may be different roles for different sets of
intermediaries at the scoping and contract stages. ICRAF’s
role is about learning how people understand and interpret
the landscape in which they live, and to find out whether
we have a common understanding or how to reach a
common understanding. Clearly without intermediaries
that would often not happen.  As researchers we are
trained to look for clarity, but in the policy domain people
actually seem to like terms that are a bit ambiguous: if it’s
not exactly clear than any politician can interpret it in
their own way. We also help in creating scenarios and
baselines, but the rest has to be negotiation between
stakeholders.  Now again coming back to this pro-poor
question, of course people have very different abilities to
raise their voice and be heard, some are comfortable
talking in a meeting room, others are not, etc, etc.  We
consider where and how these negotiations can be fair or
what/who can actually best represent the poorer sectors.
Link back with gender: who sits around the table, who signs
the contracts and who implements? At the same time, how
far can you transgress from the way things are normally
done and how much can or should you impose norms and
standards from outside? 
Q. What kind of evolution would you like to see within
the PES debate/implementation over the next five
years?
Well we really need to find new ways to combine these
realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor conditions. I
think at the moment the biggest opportunity for this is to
develop that co-investment paradigm, to recognise shared
responsibility, shared risks, respect, the human / social
capital aspects of PES before or alongside any financial
arrangements.  PES is getting some bad press because it
tries to pull things into a market efficiency language that
isn’t seen as acceptable in a developing country context. I
think the focus on pure financial transfer has negative
connotations, has negative respect.  If we can incorporate
awareness of co-investment and shared responsibility, I
think it would be a healthier debate.  
Laura Keenan (l.keenan@mtnforum.org) is Programme
Officer for Information Production and Management and
Sunita Chaudhary (s.chaudhary.mtnforum.org) is Assistant
Programme Officer for Advocacy and Policy, both at the
Mountain Forum Secretariat, Kathmandu, Nepal.
